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Abstract 
 
This article provides a systematic overview of the rules governing the end of application of 
international humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict. It articulates the general principle 
that unless there is a good reason of text, principle or policy that warrants an exception, the 
application of IHL will cease once the conditions that triggered its application in the first place 
are no longer met. For IHL to apply, its distinct thresholds of application – international armed 
conflict, belligerent occupation, and non-international armed conflict – must continue to be 
satisfied at any given point in time. The article also examines situations in which a departure 
from the general rule is warranted, as well as the factors that need to be taken into account in 
determining the end of each type of armed conflict. In doing so, the article analyzes terminating 
processes and events, which generally end the application of IHL (but not necessarily all of it), 
and transformative processes and events, which end the application of one IHL sub-regime but 
immediately engage another. Finally, the article briefly looks at the (putative) armed conflict 
between the US and Al-Qaeda and its seemingly imminent end. 
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Introduction 
 
The question when international humanitarian law (IHL) starts applying is complex enough;1 the 
end of IHL’s application perhaps even more so. It is certainly one of those questions to which the 
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relevant treaties provide no clear answer. As we will see, while some provisions of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions2 make reference to specific points in time, such as the cessation of active 
hostilities or the general close of military operations, they do not do so for the purpose of 
systematic regulation nor do they indeed define these rather vague terms more precisely. This 
inherent uncertainty is exacerbated by three further considerations. 
First, IHL is not a single, coherent body of law. It had no original designer who thought 
everything through and tied its loose strands together. Rather, like international law generally, 
IHL is written on a palimpsest, with layers building upon layers and the new replacing the old, 
but rarely, if ever, doing so completely. Thus, the Hague law regulating the conduct of hostilities 
that we still apply today was embedded in the then-customary framework in which ‘war’ was the 
operative legal concept, rigidly opposed to peace. The various waves of Geneva law then built 
upon that, with the 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols in particular redefining 
the thresholds of IHL’s applicability. And we can then add to this mix the judicial gloss of these 
thresholds, set out mainly by international criminal courts and tribunals, the developments of 
customary law that they precipitated, and further developments in state practice in the post-9/11 
global arena. 
Second, and relatedly, even the factual and objective thresholds of modern IHL are 
fragmented. One cannot truly speak of the end of application of IHL in general terms, but only of 
the end of application in the separate cases of international armed conflict (IAC), belligerent 
occupation, and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Furthermore, while some IHL rules 
apply all the time, i.e. even outside armed conflict and occupation (e.g. the obligation to 
disseminate IHL, mark cultural objects, etc.), as we will see, the application of others might have 
started with an armed conflict but need not have ended with the armed conflict (e.g. the 
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obligation to investigate and prosecute grave breaches that occurred in an IAC). And while the 
development of the substantive customary law of NIACs was frequently based on analogies to 
IACs, the structural differences between the two types of conflicts may have bearing on the 
temporal scope of IHL’s application and render such analogies more difficult.  
Third, our interpretation of the thresholds of application and IHL’s temporal scope will 
inevitably depend on how, within a particular professional setting (e.g. as domestic or 
international judges, government officials, military legal advisors, humanitarian activists, or 
academics), we weigh a number of competing, and evolving, policy considerations. In other 
words, an analysis of the end of IHL’s application by any given actor is influenced by whether 
that actor ultimately wants IHL to continue applying, in light of the consequences of 
continuation or termination. Thus, for example, in Geneva in 1949 most of the humanitarian 
community (including the ICRC) advocated for a broad applicability of IHL, particularly when it 
came to hitherto almost unregulated NIACs. Most states, on the other hand, wanted to both 
heighten the threshold for IHL application in case of NIACs and reduce the substantive scope of 
IHL rules applicable in NIACs, because they sought to preserve their own freedom to suppress 
rebellion and internal strife as they saw fit.3 Today, however, the dovish humanitarians might not 
want IHL to apply expansively, since they may see it as a departure from concurrently (and if 
need be extraterritorially) applicable IHRL. Yet now States might precisely want IHL to apply, 
since they would see it as empowering rather than constraining them, e.g. with regard to targeted 
killings and preventive detention, allowing them to avoid the more demanding rules of IHRL.4  
In yet other situations that calculus may work out differently, e.g. with regard to the 
question whether the occupation of Gaza has ended, a question which turns mainly on whether 
the continued application of IHL is seen as desirable or not. Similarly, an international criminal 
tribunal may want to take a very generous approach to IHL’s continued application since its own 
jurisdiction could depend on the existence of armed conflict as a contextual element. The 
consequences of the end of IHL's applicability, whether they concern the scope of the parties’ 
rights and obligations or individual criminal responsibility, will inevitably be taken into account. 
This is not to say that even if inevitable such result-oriented thinking is necessarily fully 
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conscious and deliberate. For what it is worth, this article will strive to weigh the various 
relevant considerations as transparently as possible. 
The article is structured as follows. It will first provide a brief overview of the changes 
that IHL underwent through the years – to the extent they are relevant to understand the 
conditions for its end of application – and will set out the general principle governing this 
process. It will then look at  which point different IHL rules cease to apply in international armed 
conflicts, belligerent occupation, and non-international armed conflicts. It subsequently examines 
the transformative processes that end the application of one IHL sub-regime (IAC or NIAC) but 
initiate the application of another. It will finish by looking at the (impending) end of the conflict 
between the United States and Al-Qaeda, one of the most current and controversial issues of 
contemporary IHL. 
 
Brief historical overview and the general principle on end of application 
 
Before we can examine the end of application of modern IHL, we need to take a brief look at the 
past, as well as the evolution of the thresholds of the beginning of IHL’s application which are 
dealt with in more detail elsewhere in this special issue.5 As noted above, the operative concept 
in customary international law before the 1949 Geneva reform (and perhaps for some time 
thereafter)6 was ‘war.’ In classical international law, war was not defined merely as a factual 
situation involving hostilities between two states, but was a legal condition whose initiation and 
end brought about a host of consequences in the relations between the belligerents among 
themselves and with third states. War and peace categorically excluded each other, as did the law 
of war and the law of peace.7 War was generally regarded as abrogating all peacetime treaties 
between the belligerents and triggered the application of the rules on neutrality for non-
belligerents. It was also both formal and subjective, requiring not merely the objective existence 
of hostilities but also the expression of an animus belligerendi. This subjective animus could be 
proven, or not, by reference to criteria such as the severance of diplomatic relations between 
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belligerents, the existence of a declaration of war or of a notification of the state of war to neutral 
powers, or the recognition of the state of war by these neutral powers.  
This in turn opened the way to situations of widespread and protracted fighting in which 
the states concerned for political reasons refused to recognise the existence of war. A gap opened 
up between a common sense, factual understanding of ‘war’ and one derived from the niceties of 
the law of nations, a gap to be exploited when it served state interests. It not only introduced a 
large degree of uncertainty with regard to the rights of private citizens, but more importantly 
created a major obstacle to the application of any humanitarian rules of the law of war. All a 
state had to do to avoid the law of war was to deny the existence of war in the technical legal 
sense, no matter how much blood was being shed in a very real sense.8 It was precisely the 
rigidity of the law of peace/law of war framework and the strict consequences that followed the 
transition from one to the other that provided the incentive for states to avoid recognizing the 
existence of war. This led some scholars of the period to argue for the legal recognition of a 
third, middle category between war and peace – a status mixtus.9 Others, in turn, wanted to 
objectivize war.10 But what the humanitarian lawyers may have wanted and what states thought 
to be in their interest was not necessarily one and the same. Rather than bringing some 
resolution, the controversies on the legal nature of war brought even more uncertainty.11  
Since ‘war’ was a formal business it also needed to be formally terminated. While 
hostilities could be interrupted through an agreed-upon truce or cease fire, or a more 
comprehensive armistice, the end of war generally required a peace treaty.12 It was only upon the 
conclusion of such a treaty that normal relations between the parties could resume and their 
earlier peacetime treaties could be revived.  
This was still the relevant framework as the Second World War started, but its aftermath 
saw the addition of more layers to the palimpsest of international law. First, even though the 
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recourse to war as an instrument of national policy was already outlawed under the terms of the 
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, the adoption of the UN Charter and its general prohibition on the use 
of force (not just ‘war’) truly created the jus ad bellum as separate from the jus in bello. Second, 
the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was generally detached from the formal 
concept of war. Common Article 2 (CA2) introduced the concept of international armed conflict 
(IAC),13 which was designed as an objective, factual replacement for the narrower concept of 
‘war’ while retaining its predecessor’s inter-state nature.   
The 1949 Geneva Conventions also introduced the first systematic regulation of internal 
conflicts, through the concept of non-international armed conflict (NIAC) under Common 
Article 3 of the Conventions (CA3). At the time of the Conventions’ adoption, the NIAC 
threshold brought about only the application of CA3 itself and its purely humanitarian provisions 
protecting persons not taking part in hostilities or rendered hors de combat. That was the sum 
total of the conventional law of armed conflicts as it applied to NIACs in 1949; for example it 
contained no rules on the conduct of hostilities analogous to IACs.  
Over time, however, through the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols, and the 
evolution of customary law, the law of armed conflict coalesced around the two factual 
thresholds set out in the 1949 Conventions. Not only is the CA2 threshold also valid for the 
application of API rules,14 but it also became the threshold for application of the customary 
‘Hague law’ on the conduct of hostilities. This was also the case with the CA3 NIAC threshold, 
whereas the gaps in the regulation of NIACs were filled mainly through custom. The 1949 
Geneva Conventions’ thresholds of application thus became the thresholds for the application of 
customary IHL more generally. The obsolescence of the concept of traditional concept of “war” 
became almost complete, with states simply no longer declaring war against one another or 
formally expressing their view that war exists. Similarly, the distinctions between cease-fires, 
armistices and peace treaties gradually blurred, with peace treaties in particular becoming 
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increasingly rare,15 and conflicts frequently ending with less formal instruments such as 
armistices, unilateral or joint declarations or simply de facto.  
But as the law of war was being rewritten into the law of armed conflict, the concept of 
“war” was still not abandoned formally even if it was abandoned in fact as a condition for IHL 
applicability.  Looking at the IHL palimpsest, one issue that arises is whether the concept of 
“war” still has any relevance for our modern debates. Notably, Common Article 2 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions explicitly provides that they “shall apply to all cases of declared war,” thus 
making it possible for the Conventions (and the relevant custom) to begin applying before a 
single shot has been fired. But conversely, will their application end only with the end of the war 
in the formal, technical legal sense, once a state of war commenced on top of a plain 
international armed conflict? Just consider a scenario of war with hostilities long having come to 
an end, yet without a peace treaty or any kind of formal instrument normalizing in full the 
relations between the parties. 
Some authors, most notably Yoram Dinstein, still give significance to war as a legal 
concept.16 Most, however, and here I include myself, would argue that the main point of the 1949 
Geneva reform was precisely to do away with the subjectivity and formalism of war, and make 
the thresholds of application objective and factual, with this tendency only being strengthened in 
the intervening years.17 Having said that, the possibility of the ‘old’ law still having an influence 
cannot be conclusively excluded, especially because the concept of war transgressed the 
boundaries between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. However, that influence is likely to be 
minimal. In the case of a ‘war’ in which hostilities have de facto ended with permanence and 
finality even in the absence of a formal conclusion of peace, as a matter of the jus ad bellum any 
residual right to resume hostilities would be precluded by the UN Charter prohibition on the use 
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of force,18 while in the absence of actual hostilities or prisoners of war or protected persons in the 
hands of the adversary IHL would have little or nothing to regulate.19 
 Rules governing the beginning and end of the application of IHL are both customary and 
conventional in nature. With regard to the conventional rules, of relevance to the temporal 
application of IHL are also some general issues of the law of treaties with regard to entry into 
force and withdrawal. While the Geneva Conventions have achieved practically universal 
adoption, the general rules on entry into force are of particular relevance for newly formed states, 
who can become parties to treaties through accession or (automatic?) succession.20 On the other 
hand, it is perhaps surprising that both the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
contain explicit provisions permitting their denunciation.21 No state party has ever denounced 
one of these treaties, and the inevitable political fallout would render this highly unlikely in the 
future. The denunciation provisions also contain explicit safeguards 22that would render any 
denunciation ineffective with regard to situations arising from an existing armed conflict or with 
regard to protected persons already in captivity. The key legal safeguard, however, is the fact that 
most of the rules in the Conventions and the Protocols have achieved customary status, and 
would accordingly bind the denouncing state in any event. In the discussion to follow I will 
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of the Korean Armistice Agreement,’ Military Law Review, Vol. 47, 2007, p. 105. For arguments that the 1953 
armistice did, in fact, terminate the state of war, see, e.g., Y. Dinstein, above note 16, pp. 43-44. W. Heintschel von 
Heinegg, ‘Factors in War to Peace Transitions,’  Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 27 Issue 3, Summer 
2004, pp. 843, 849-854. 
20 This was for example an issue in the Ethiopia/Eritrea arbitration; Eritrea had not made a declaration of succession 
to the Conventions upon its independence in 1993 or thereafter and consistently maintained that it was not bound by 
them, only acceding to them in 2000, after its conflict with Ethiopia had ended. The Claims Commission found that 
Eritrea was not a party to the Conventions until its accession, but that most of the Conventions’ rules reflected 
customary IHL which was indeed binding upon Eritrea – see Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, 
Prisoners of War – Eritrea’s Claim 17, 1 July 2003, paras. 31-42. 
21 Art. 63 GC I, Art. 62 GC II, Art. 142 GC III, Art. 158 GC IV, Art. 99 AP I; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (‘AP II’), Art. 25. 
22 For example, Art. 142(2) GC III provides that: ‘The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notification 
thereof has been made to the Swiss Federal Council. However, a denunciation of which notification has been made 
at a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, 
and until after operations connected with the release and repatriation of the persons protected by the present 
Convention have been terminated.’ 
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accordingly disregard any potential issues arising from the general law of treaties, with the 
caveat that conventional rules that do not reflect custom could potentially be affected.23  
Bearing in mind the evolution of the modern IHL regime, as well as its fragmented 
nature, we can state at this point the one general principle on the end of application of IHL that 
will form the basis for further discussion: unless there is a good reason of text, principle or policy 
that warrants an exception, the application of IHL will cease once the conditions that triggered its 
application in the first place no longer exist. In other words, if a particular situation can no longer 
be qualified as an IAC, NIAC, or an occupation, the application of IHL will end.24  
In the absence of any specific guidance to the contrary, this general principle makes 
perfect sense in the factual, objective threshold set by the Geneva Conventions. For IHL to apply 
its thresholds of application must continue to be satisfied at any given point in time. In order to 
elaborate on this general principle we must of course look at the constitutive elements of each 
threshold, in the context of those particular scenarios in which these elements might be 
extinguished. We must then establish whether a departure from the general rule is warranted, and 
whether some rules continue applying even after an armed conflict has ended. We will then 
observe certain terminating processes and events, which generally end the application of IHL 
(but not necessarily all of it),25 and certain transformative processes and events, which end the 
application of one IHL sub-regime (IAC or NIAC) but immediately engage another. 
Let me now deal with each threshold in turn. 
 
International armed conflict 
 
As we have seen, the concept of IAC was crafted as an explicit replacement for the concept of 
war. As with the concept of war, IAC as defined in CA2 is of an interstate nature, a conflict 
between two sovereigns. In the words of the authoritative Pictet Commentary: 
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Oxford, 2008, pp. 104-105. 
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Development of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, January 27-29, 2003, p. 3, available at 
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session3.pdf; J. Kleffner, above note 7, p. 61.  
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Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of 
the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of [Common] Article 2, even if 
one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long 
the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating 
forces; it suffices for the armed forces of one Power to have captured adversaries falling 
within the scope of Article 4 [of the Third Geneva Convention]. Even if there has been no 
fighting, the fact that persons covered by the Convention are detained is sufficient for its 
application.26 
 
The CA2 threshold is thus remarkably low – all it needs is a difference between two states 
leading to the intervention of their armed forces.27 Whether Pictet is indeed correct in this, or 
whether a de minimis level of violence needs to occur in order to avoid minor exchanges of 
firepower between the forces of two states (e.g. a single rifle short across the border) being 
classified as IACs, is not the object of my inquiry at this time. Opinions and practice on this 
point are conflicted.28 Yet, however exactly defined, the IAC threshold is certainly far lower than 
the NIAC ‘protracted armed violence’ threshold to which I will come momentarily, since the 
IAC threshold was not subject to the same sovereignty concerns as NIACs. A particular amount 
of violence may produce an IAC if perpetrated between states, but might not qualify as a NIAC 
if committed by or against non-state actors. 
As we have also seen, the principal distinguishing point between ‘war’ and IAC is the 
latter’s objective and factual nature. The end of IAC should equally be based on purely factual 
criteria – what matters is that the hostilities between the two parties have ceased. Because, 
however, the IAC threshold is relatively easy to satisfy, and because it would be both impractical 
and open the door to abuse to treat every lull in the fighting as an end to an IAC and each 
resumption of combat as the start of a new one, hostilities must end with a degree of stability and 
permanence in order for the IAC to be terminated.29 Thus, for example, in the Gotovina case the 
Trial Chamber stated that: 
Once the law of armed conflict has become applicable, one should not lightly conclude 
that its applicability ceases. Otherwise, the participants in an armed conflict may find 
themselves in a revolving door between applicability and non-applicability, leading to a 
                                                          
26 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. III: Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, ICRC, Geneva, 1960, Art. 2(1), p. 23.  
27 M. Milanovic and V. Hadzi-Vidanovic, above note 1, p. 274. 
28 See more J. Kleffner, above note 7, pp. 44-45. 
29 Cf. Jinks, above note 24, at 3: ‘Given the de facto “armed conflict” regime of the Geneva Conventions, the 
general applicability of international humanitarian law terminates if active hostilities cease and there is no 
probability of a resumption of hostilities in the near future.’ See also Kolb and Hyde, above note 23, at 102. 
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considerable degree of legal uncertainty and confusion. The Trial Chamber will therefore 
consider whether at any point during the Indictment period the international armed 
conflict had found a sufficiently general, definitive and effective termination so as to end 
the applicability of the law of armed conflict. It will consider in particular whether there 
was a general close of military operations and a general conclusion of peace.30  
 
This is always a factual assessment, which will vary from case to case and the exact time at 
which the IAC ended may be hard to point out. Agreements concluded by the belligerent parties, 
however called, unilateral statements by either of them, or resolutions of relevant international 
organizations, e.g. those of the UN Security Council,31 may provide evidence that the hostilities 
have ended with the needed degree of stability and permanence. But it is the fact that the 
hostilities have ended that ultimately matters, not the precise legal nature of the instrument in 
question.32 Depending on the political and military environment, a cease-fire agreement or an 
armistice may actually signify the point at which the hostilities have permanently ended, while a 
formal peace treaty might not be worth the paper it is written on if hostilities continue unabated. 
This factual approach is supported by what little we have in the Geneva Conventions 
regarding the end of their application. Thus, Article 118(1) GC III provides that ‘[p]risoners of 
war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.’ The 
repatriation obligation would naturally only be acceptable to states if hostilities had ended more 
or less permanently. Article 6(2) GC IV, on the other hand, stipulates in the relevant part that 
‘[i]n the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall cease 
on the general close of military operations.’ The common provisions on the denunciation of the 
Geneva Conventions mentioned above refer to yet another point in time when they stipulate that 
‘a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time when the denouncing Power is 
involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded.’ 33 Here we have three 
moments in time: the cessation of active hostilities, the general close of military operations, and 
the conclusion of peace. 
Article 5 GC III and Article 6(4) GCIV, on the other hand, make it clear that the 
Convention will continue to apply even after the general close of military operations if protected 
                                                          
30 Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Trial Chamber Judgment, 15 April 2011, para. 1694. 
31 Leaving aside the possibility that the Council is through its decisions actually modifying the applicable IHL 
regime, or indeed that it has the power to do so. 
32 See also Kleffner, above note 7, at 61, 70. 
33  Art. 63(3) GC I, Art. 62(3) GC II, Art. 142(3) GC III, Art. 158(3) GC IV. 
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persons are still in the power of the enemy and they have not been released or repatriated before 
that time. Article 3(b) of AP I also sets out this principle very clearly: 
the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the territory of 
Parties to the conflict, on the general close of military operations and, in the case of 
occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation, except, in either circumstance, 
for those persons whose final release, repatriation or re-establishment takes place 
thereafter. These persons shall continue to benefit from the relevant provisions of the 
Conventions and of this Protocol until their final release, repatriation or re-establishment.  
 
It is unclear whether the drafters of the Conventions were making a firm distinction 
between the ‘cessation of active hostilities’ standard in Article 118(1) GC III and the ‘general 
close of military operations’ in Article 6(2) GC IV and later in Article 3(b) AP I, i.e. whether the 
distinction was deliberate or was the consequences of uncoordinated drafting. What is clear is 
that the primary motivation behind the GC III formula was to depart from the earlier rule set out 
in Article 20 of the Hague Regulations, under which the obligation to repatriate prisoners of war 
started only at the (formal) conclusion of peace. This meant that in several instances in which the 
conflict had de facto ended but without a formal peace treaty, or with treaty negotiations taking a 
very long time, vast numbers of prisoners of war continued to be held without any real need to 
do so.34 This of course does not mean that the GC III standard necessarily assures swift 
repatriation in practice, the lengthy repatriation efforts after the 1980-1988 Iran/Iraq war being a 
case in point. As for the Art. 6(2) GC IV ‘general close of military operations’ formula, the Pictet 
commentary interprets it as a ‘final end of all fighting between all those concerned.’35 Note that 
the test is an objective and factual one; as argued above, while an armistice or peace treaty can 
serve as evidence of the finality of the end of fighting, formal agreements are neither required 
nor conclusive on the point.36 The general close of military operations implies an end of the 
                                                          
34 See J. Pictet, above note 26, Vol. 3: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, pp. 541-
543. 
35 Ibid., Vol. 4: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 6(2), p. 62. 
36 The ICTY Appeals Chamber’s dictum in Tadic that ‘[i]nternational humanitarian law applies from the initiation of 
such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; 
or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved’ is in my view too insistent, at least implicitly, 
with regard to the consensual nature of the end of conflict. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-AR72, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, para. 
70. On the end of IHL application in non-international armed conflicts, see below. What matters is finality de facto; 
plenty of armed conflicts, both international and internal, have ended without any kind of formal agreement or 
settlement, e.g. the NIAC in Sri-Lanka. 
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fighting between all of the belligerents,37 even though active hostilities may have ceased between 
some at a much earlier date (consider the 1940 surrender of France while the UK continued 
fighting, or the different times of the surrender of Germany and Japan during the Second World 
War). 
The ICRC commentary to AP I tried to draw more of a distinction between the ‘general 
close of military operations’ and the ‘cessation of active hostilities’ formulas. Thus, it held that 
military operations can be taken more broadly than actual combat as including ‘the movements, 
manoeuvres and actions of any sort, carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat’ and 
that ‘[t]he general close of military operations may occur after the “cessation of active 
hostilities” referred to in Article 118 of the Third Convention: although a ceasefire, even a tacit 
ceasefire, may be sufficient for that Convention, military operations can often continue after such 
a ceasefire, even without confrontations.’38 The distinction is also supported by academic 
commentary.39 However, depending on the circumstances on the ground the distinction may 
actually be hard to draw, i.e. the cessation of active hostilities and the general close of (combat-
oriented) military operations may occur at the same time, or very close to one another. 
In sum, we can conclude that an IAC would end with a general close of military 
operations, with no real likelihood of a resumption in hostilities. The end of the IAC will also 
end the application of those rules of IHL regulating the conduct of hostilities. It will also end any 
IHL-granted authority to detain combatants or civilians preventively purely on grounds of 
security.40 However, as we have also seen, some obligations under IHL will survive the end of 
the armed conflict, and indeed may be triggered by the conflict’s (imminent) end, as with the 
obligation to repatriate prisoners of war. Persons who remain in the power of the enemy will 
continue enjoying the protections of IHL until their repatriation or release, including inter alia 
the right of access by the ICRC, even if IHL no longer authorizes their continued detention. They 
                                                          
37 See J. Pictet, above note 26, Vol. 4: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Art. 6(2), p. 62. 
38 See Y. Sandoz et al. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, commentary on Art. 3 (b), paras. 152-153. 
39 See, e.g., Jinks, above note 24, at 3; L. Blank, ‘A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention 
Too Far,’ Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 64, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 1169, 1179-1182; R. Bartels, “From Jus In Bello to Jus 
Post Bellum: When do Non-International Armed Conflicts End?”, in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday and Jens 
Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 
297, 300-303. 
40 See J. Pejic, ‘Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for International Law?,’ British Yearbook of International Law, 
Vol. 75, 2004, pp., 71, 78 and 81.  See more below on the question whether IHL actually grants such authority, or 
merely sets limits on state action. 
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will also continue benefiting from fundamental guarantees in Article 75(6) AP I, under which 
‘[p]ersons who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict shall 
enjoy the protection provided by this Article until their final release, repatriation or re-
establishment, even after the end of the armed conflict’ (emphasis added). These protections 
would normally be complemented by human rights law, and to the extent that IHL allows any 
departures from human rights, e.g. by virtue of the lex specialis principle, such departures would 
no longer be permitted with the end of the conflict.41 Similarly, Article 33(1) AP I provides that 
‘[a]s soon as circumstances permit, and at the latest from the end of active hostilities, each Party 
to the conflict shall search for the persons who have been reported missing by an adverse Party’ 
(emphasis added). This and other obligations with regard to missing and dead persons, e.g. 
facilitating access to gravesites, will continue applying after the end of the conflict, as would the 
obligations to investigate and prosecute grave breaches of the Conventions and Protocol I. 
There are thus a number of exceptions to the general principle on end of application. The 
exceptions are not themselves temporally limited, i.e. further passage of time after the end of the 
conflict cannot by itself terminate the extant obligations. For example, if a state detains a 
prisoner of war for decades after the conflict, he would still be protected by IHL. The obligation 
would only terminate if its functional predicate is discharged, e.g. the prisoner is repatriated.  
As with IHL generally, this interaction between the general principle and the exceptions 
thereto strikes a balance between military necessity and considerations of humanity. Clarity and 
predictability require that the end of a conflict should be presumed lightly. Rules on the conduct 
of hostilities stop applying only once the hostilities have definitively ended, while the cessation 
of hostilities will initiate the obligation to repatriate prisoners of war and release any civilian 
internees, because this is when the obligation can be realistically complied with and the need for 
such measures ceases. The protective rules on treatment in detention will continue applying 
while the detention lasts, which is of the greatest importance in cases of delayed repatriation. The 
need to protect persons deprived of liberty for reasons related to an armed conflict does not end 
with the conflict itself, nor would say any serious violence against these persons by any less of a 
war crime. Similarly, the obligation to repress grave breaches can at times be implemented even 
                                                          
41 The legal effects of lex specialis are in my view quite modest; it does no more than allow human rights norms to 
be interpreted in the light of IHL (and vice versa where appropriate), but does not allow for their displacement in the 
event of any contradiction between the two. See M. Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law,’ in Orna Ben-Naftali ed., International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 95. 
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more effectively in the post-conflict period, as investigations and any prosecutions can take place 
unhindered by active hostilities. 
 I will now briefly look at the end of belligerent occupation as a subspecies of or a 
threshold complementary to IAC. 
 
Belligerent occupation 
 
The end of occupation is again a complex topic, recently examined, for instance, by an expert 
meeting on occupation convened by the ICRC.42 I will now address it only very briefly. As with 
IACs and NIACs we can start off with the general principle that IHL will normally cease to 
apply once its threshold of application – here belligerent occupation – is no longer met. If we 
define occupation as effective control by a state of the territory of another state without the 
latter’s consent,43 it follows that there are two basic modalities through which an occupation can 
end: loss of control by the occupant, or the occupant being granted valid consent by the displaced 
sovereign.  
This basic position was not spelled out in the 1907 Hague Regulations, but it again 
follows from the very definition of the concept of occupation in Article 42: ‘Territory is 
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The 
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be 
exercised’ (emphasis added). The inability to exercise authority would consequently terminate 
the occupation; the difficult question is what factors are to be taken into account in establishing 
whether the occupant lost control over a territory or a substantial part thereof.  
Article 6(3) GC IV provided that in occupied territory ‘the application of the present 
Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the 
Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such 
Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following 
Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143.’ 
Article 6(3) GC IV focused on those situations in which the occupation outlives the IAC that 
                                                          
42 See T. Ferraro, Occupation and other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory, Expert Meeting Report, 
ICRC, 2012, pp. 26 ff., available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p4094.htm. See also 
Vaios Koutroulis, Le début et la fin de l’application du droit de l’occupation, Pedone, Paris, 2010. 
43 See generally Y. Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (CUP, 2009), at 35. 
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created it, with the application of most of the Convention ending one year after the factual end of 
the conflict, and only a number of core humanitarian provisions applying thereafter, and even 
those only to the extent that the occupying power exercises the functions of government in the 
occupied territory. The provision was essentially tailor-made for the transformative occupations 
by the Allies of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, which were extensive, 
prolonged, followed the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers or debellatio, and ended 
gradually through the creation of new institutions of self-government.44  
Article 3(b) AP I dropped the one-year limit from GC IV, providing that it would cease to 
apply ‘in the case of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation,’ whereas as we 
have seen above persons still in captivity would continue to be protected by the Protocol.45 
Whether customary IHL would follow Article 3(b) AP I and displace Article 6(3) GC IV even 
for states not parties to AP I is a difficult question which I will not address here – suffice it to say 
that while GC IV’s applicability qua treaty remains governed by Article 6(3), it is perfectly 
possible for treaties to be supplanted by supervening custom, if the existence of the customary 
rule is indeed established.46 
Occupation can end through loss of control in a variety of scenarios: unilateral 
withdrawal; defeat of the occupying forces by the displaced sovereign or other outside 
intervention; or loss of control due to an insurgency in the occupied territory. The inquiry into 
loss of control should always be objective, factual, and contextual, taking into account all of the 
circumstances on a case by case basis, and subject to two basic principles. First, as with IACs 
and NIACs the end of occupation should not be presumed lightly. In particular, once the 
occupation is established, the maintenance of occupation might not require overt and frequent 
displays of military strength by the occupant, especially if the occupation faces little or no 
resistance and there are no competing authorities on the ground. Second, not every temporary 
                                                          
44 See Pictet, above note 26, commentary on Art. 6 GC IV, pp. 62-63. On transformative occupation see also A. 
Roberts, ‘Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights,’ American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 100, 2006, p. 580. 
45 See also R. Kolb and R. Hyde, above note 23, pp. 103-104. 
46 In the Wall case the ICJ did not seem to consider this possibility, finding that due to the passage of time only those 
provisions of GC IV mentioned in Article 6(3) continued to apply in the occupied Palestinian territory, although the 
remaining provisions were not really central to the case. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, pp. 136, 185, para. 125. While agreeing with 
the Court that Article 6(3) GC IV will be the governing framework for states not parties to AP I, such as Israel, 
Dinstein argues that any outbreak of hostilities in the occupied territory (such as the Palestinian intifadas) will 
reinstate the applicability of the whole of GC IV and restart the time limit in Article 6(3) GC IV - see Y. Dinstein, 
above note 43, pp. 280-283. 
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lapse in control would terminate the occupation.47 No matter how powerful the occupant, it may 
be impossible for it to control every single bit of the occupied territory all the time, especially in 
the case of an insurgency (only consider post-2003 Iraq, or the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia in 
the face of partisan resistance). So long as the lapse in control is only temporary or very 
localized, and so long as the occupant has the full capacity to re-establish its control, the 
occupation should be considered to be uninterrupted.48 Clearly, opinions will differ on the facts 
of specific cases whether an occupation has ended through loss of control, as with the Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza, but the basic principle is I think relatively uncontested.  
End of occupation through loss of control has parallels in the extraterritorial applicability 
of human rights law in the occupied territory – one issue raised before British courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Al-Skeini litigation was whether the UK possessed 
effective control for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR jurisdiction in Basra, due to the level of 
sustained insurgency there, and despite the fact that the UK was formally the occupant in 
Southern Iraq. The House of Lords held that the UK did, in fact, lose effective control for the 
purposes of Article 1 ECHR even if it formally remained the occupying power for the purpose of 
IHL,49 while the Grand Chamber of the European Court avoided the issue altogether.50 The issue 
of whether the effective control thresholds for occupation and for the application of human rights 
treaties differ or not remains unresolved.51 
With regard to occupation ending by the occupant obtaining consent, it is generally 
possible for the displaced sovereign to agree to the presence of the (former) occupier, whether by 
way of a peace treaty or some other kind of formal or informal agreement.52 Note in that regard 
                                                          
47 See Y. Dinstein, above note 43, p. 272: ‘A definitive close of the occupation can only follow upon a durable shift 
of effective control in the territory from the Occuping Power to the restored sovereign (or its allies).’ 
48 See United States of America v. Wilhelm List et al., in Law Reports of Trials of Major War Criminals, Vol. VIII, 
1949, pp. 38, 55–6 (holding that the German occupation of partisan-held parts of Yugoslavia did not cease since ‘the 
Germans could at any time they desired assume physical control of any part’ of Yugoslavia); see also ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No IT-98-34-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 31 March 2003, para. 217 (holding that ‘an 
occupation exists so long as the occupying army has the ‘capacity to send troops within a reasonable time to make 
the authority of the occupying power felt’). 
49 R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] AC 153, 
para. 83 (per Lord Rodger).    
50 European Court of Human Rights, Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber), 7 July 2011.  
51 Bearing in mind that the positive obligation to secure or ensure human rights is a flexible one, I would tentatively 
argue that the two thresholds should be the same – see M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, pp. 141-147. 
52 See E. Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 (2nd ed.), pp. 63, 
67.  
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that Article 7 GC IV prohibits special agreements between states parties when these agreements 
adversely affect the situation of protected persons. However, such agreements are only 
prohibited in situations in which the Fourth Convention itself applies, and Article 7 does not 
preclude the general provision of genuine consent by a state to the presence of foreign forces, 
assuming that a government exists which can validly provide that consent.53 That expression of 
consent would be subject to the general principle articulated in Article 52 VCLT, which provides 
that a treaty is void if it is procured by coercion of a state by threat or use of force contrary to the 
UN Charter.54 It is also possible for the government of the displaced sovereign (whose territory 
may or may not have been occupied in its totality) to change, often at the instigation or at least 
with the input of the occupant, and then provide consent. Article 47 GC IV makes it clear that 
any changes in the (local) government of the occupied territory, or any purported annexation of 
that territory by the occupant, cannot alter the applicability of the law of occupation.55 But what 
of those situations in which the government of the displaced sovereign is wholly destroyed or 
changed, as was the case in Iraq post-2003? In this respect we can observe at work similar 
considerations as with the transformative process of the internalization of an IAC into a NIAC, 
which I will deal with in detail below. What entity has the sufficient capacity and legitimacy to 
provide meaningful consent on behalf of a state may be a difficult and controversial issue.  
 
Non-international armed conflict 
 
This brings us to the end of application of IHL in NIACs. We have seen that the end of IHL 
application in IACs and occupation is complex enough. This complexity is exacerbated with 
regard to NIACs by the structural differences between IACs and NIACs and the almost complete 
lack of any textual guidance. CA3 says nothing about its end of application, while Article 2(2) 
                                                          
53 Cf. A. Roberts, ‘What is a Military Occupation?,’ British Yearbook of International Law Vol. 97, 1984, pp. 249, 
276-279, 287-288. 
54 For example, for an argument that the 1999 Kumanovo Military Technical Agreement whereby the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia consented to the presence of NATO troops on its territory was possibility vitiated by 
coercion, with Kosovo thereby constituting an occupied territory, see J. Cerone, ‘Minding the Gap: Outlining 
KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo,’ European Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, Issue 3, 2001, pp.  
469, 484. See also Benvenisti, supra note 52, chapter 10. 
55 Art. 47 GCIV provides: ‘Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in 
any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the 
occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded 
between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of 
the whole or part of the occupied territory.’ 
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AP II appears to endorse the general rule that the application of IHL will end with the conflict 
which initiated it when it provides for the humanitarian exception from the general rule regarding 
persons who remain in captivity: ‘At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been 
deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, 
as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the 
same reasons, shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or 
restriction of liberty.’ In short, drawing analogies with IACs will be difficult. 
As it stands today, NIAC is a plural legal concept, defined differently under different 
treaty regimes. The basic (non-)definition of NIAC, which encompasses all others, is that in 
CA3. Its terms were famously elaborated by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic 
Interlocutory Decision on Jurisdiction,56 which has been widely accepted as reflecting custom. 
Under Tadic, CA3 requires ‘protracted armed violence’ – a threshold of intensity and possibly 
duration, rising above mere riots or disturbances – between a state and an armed non-state actor 
or between two such non-state actors, which are sufficiently organized to conduct hostilities.57 
On the other hand, the heightened threshold of Article 1(1) AP II, which is only applicable to 
conflicts involving a state and a non-state actor, but not two such non-state actors, requires the 
non-state actor to have an organizational structure with a responsible command, control a part of 
the state’s territory, the ability to conduct sustained and concerted military operations and the 
ability to implement the Protocol. I will leave aside the question to what extent exactly is the AP 
II threshold really higher from the customary CA3 one when applied to particular facts. 
As with IACs, the termination of NIACs is a factual inquiry, but the intensity and 
organization thresholds in CA3 and AP II makes that inquiry even less straightforward than in 
IACs. As we have seen, for IACs to end, the hostilities themselves need to end with a certain 
degree of permanence or finality. One option would be to treat NIACs in exactly the same way – 
so long as some hostilities continue, so would a NIAC.58 This seems to be the implication of the 
insistence of the ICTY in Tadic that IHL applies ‘in the case of internal conflicts, [until] a 
                                                          
56 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995, para. 70. 
57 According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.’ ICTY, Tadic case, Ibid., para. 70. For more detailed discussion regarding the 
elements of the NIAC threshold, see J. Kleffner, above note 7, pp. 49-50; M. Milanovic and V. Hadzi-Vidanovic, 
above note 10, pp. 282 et seq. 
58 Cf. S. Sivakumaran, above note 3, pp. 252-254. See also Jinks, above note 24, pp. 7-8. 
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peaceful settlement is achieved.’59 This makes perfect sense from the standpoint of an 
international criminal tribunal which wants to stabilize its jurisdiction and catch within it as 
many perpetrators of war crimes as possible. Thus, for instance, with respect to the non-
international armed conflict between Serbia and the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998, the first 
Trial Chamber judgment in the Haradinaj case found that ‘since according to the Tadić test an 
internal armed conflict continues until a peaceful settlement is achieved, and since there is no 
evidence of such a settlement during the indictment period, there is no need for the Trial 
Chamber to explore the oscillating intensity of the armed conflict in the remainder of the 
indictment period.’60 The Tribunal’s task was accordingly much easier. 
Another option, however, and to me more logical from a purely IHL standpoint, would be 
to take into account the heightened NIAC intensity threshold when compared to IACs, since this 
is where the analogy with IACs may be at a breaking point. Any resumption of hostilities 
between states would in any event reconstitute an IAC, and it therefore makes sense to wait for 
the complete end of all hostilities for the IAC to be terminated. In NIACs, by contrast, it could be 
enough for the hostilities to fall below the threshold of ‘protracted armed violence’ with a certain 
degree of permanence and stability so as to enable us to establish that the hostilities have, in fact, 
ended. As with IACs, once the threshold is met there should be a presumption that it continues to 
be met absent strong evidence to the contrary – as a matter of policy, a NIAC which peters in and 
out of existence on a daily basis would be undesirable. But unlike with IACs, in NIACs the 
hostilities would not need to end altogether. What would matter is whether the intensity of the 
hostilities or the organization of the non-state actor factually eroded to such an extent that the 
threshold is no longer met.61 For example, looking at the post-2003 conflict in Iraq, which 
involved the new Iraqi government and its foreign allies on one side, and several organized 
armed groups on the other, it could be argued that this NIAC (or set of NIACs) ended at some 
point in late 2009, as the capacity of insurgent groups was degraded and the level of armed 
violence decreased (even if the violence never ended completely). In August 2010, the US 
military ended its combat troops from Iraq. But after a period of relative calm, violence rapidly 
                                                          
59 See above note 36. 
60 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al, Case No IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 3 April 2008, para. 100. 
The issue was not revisited in the subsequent litigation in Haradinaj, as the parties agreed on the scope of the armed 
conflict when the case was re-tried. 
61 See also R. Bartels, above note 39, pp. 303 et seq (arguing that the organization element is of special relevance in 
the context of the end of NIAC, and providing an overview of the ICTY jurisprudence on factors and indicators of 
the intensity and organization criteria). 
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escalated in 2012 and 2013, as armed groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIS) regrouped and reorganized, and a new NIAC was initiated.   
As with IACs, NIACs can end through an agreement between the parties, a stalemate, or 
one of the parties’ defeat and surrender, but again the only legally relevant question would be 
whether the threshold continues to be satisfied. Similarly, AP II NIACs could end or transform 
into simple CA3 NIACs if the non-state actor fighting the state becomes so structurally 
compromised that it no longer has control over territory, or the ability to conduct sustained and 
concerted military operations or implement the Protocol. The disadvantage of this approach is 
the greater likelihood of multiple transitions between peace and NIAC. 
For an example of a NIAC ending through the complete defeat of an adversary we need 
only look at the Sri Lanka conflict. An example of a NIAC petering out would be post-2007 
surge Iraq. Again, the inquiry is purely factual. In some cases it will be relatively easy to 
determine the exact moment when the conflict ended, especially when there is a peace agreement 
(as long as the agreement is, in fact, observed). In others, it might be exceedingly difficult to 
pinpoint the exact time when the hostilities fell below the ‘protracted armed violence’ threshold, 
with Iraq again being a case in point. 
Note again how diverging policy considerations can influence the contextual 
determination of whether the NIAC has ended, depending on the identity and the goals of the 
actor making the determination. For example, the end of the conflict would signal the end of any 
authority to detain individuals preventively and the resumption of the normal human rights 
regime (to the extent that IHL was actually capable of displacing it). If the actor making the 
determination cares about the possible arbitrary exercise of state power, it might be inclined to 
see the end of the NIAC more quickly. If, on the other hand, it cares about the arbitrary exercise 
of power by the non-state actor, which is bound by IHL but probably not by human rights law, 
then that calculus may turn out differently.  
 
Transformation: internationalization (NIACIAC) and internalization (IACNIAC) 
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Until now we have looked at terminative events or processes, which end the application of IHL. 
But we also need to examine transformative processes, which end the application of one IHL 
sub-regime but start another.62  
Let us first look at internationalization, one of the most controversial topics of modern 
IHL. In my view, the concept of internationalization is only legally useful if it is defined as the 
transformation of a prima facie NIAC into an IAC, thereby applying to this conflict the more 
comprehensive IAC legal regime.63 The most important of these legal consequences is the grant, 
in principle, of combatant immunity and potential prisoner of war status to combatants on both 
sides of the conflict. As for the mechanism of internationalization, we have seen that under CA2 
IACs are defined as differences leading to the use of armed force between two states. 
Accordingly, there are two basic ways of internationalizing a NIAC. First, a prima facie NIAC 
can be subsumed under the existing CA2 definition. In other words, what at first glance looks 
like a conflict between a state and a non-state actor is on a deeper look actually a conflict 
between two states. This can either happen because a third state exercises control over a non-
state actor at some point during a NIAC, with the most controversial issue here being what test or 
standard of control is to be applied, or because a non-state actor involved in a NIAC emerges as 
a state during the conflict – a rare occurrence, but one that we can perhaps observe with regard to 
some of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.  
Secondly, a NIAC can be internationalized through the redefinition of IAC in terms of its 
party structure. In these cases a treaty or customary rule changes the CA2 definition so as to 
potentially include some non-state parties. Internationalization under this heading would clearly 
require proof of a specific rule to that effect. One such rule can be found in Article 1(4) AP I 
(self-determination conflicts against colonial, occupying or racist regimes), subject to a 
declaration under Article 96(3) AP I, while another possible candidate is the customary doctrine 
of the recognition of belligerency which has fallen into disuse, but perhaps not desuetude.64  
                                                          
62 This section incorporates much of the discussion in M. Milanovic & V. Hadzi-Vidanovic, above note 1, pp. 292-
293. 
63 Note that one can use the term internationalized armed conflict in a different, descriptive sense, as any NIAC in 
which there is some type of foreign intervention. This is again, not how I will be using the term, in order to 
maximize both its utility and precision. 
64 For more on the mechanisms of internationalization, see M. Milanovic and V. Hadzi-Vidanovic, above note 1, pp. 
292-302. 
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The second transformative process is internalization, or de-internationalization, and it 
again flows from the inter-state CA2 definition.65 It is easy to say that IACs are fought between 
states and statehood may even be uncontested in a given case, but who gets to represent the state 
may turn out to be a very difficult issue. Not only is this question important for the initial 
qualification of a conflict, but it may also prove to be crucial for its requalification or transition 
from one type to another. Consider all those conflicts during which some kind of regime change 
takes place, whether in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, or the Côte d’Ivoire.  In all of these conflicts we 
had some form of foreign intervention coupled with a reversal of roles between a government 
and a rebel group, with a new government extending its invitation to the intervening state or 
states to assist it in fighting the former government. 
What is at stake here is a process of transformation from an IAC into a NIAC. Looking at 
the competing policy considerations, we can see what is not enough for such internalization to 
occur. That the incumbent government of a country is defeated cannot by itself transform the 
conflict, nor can the establishment of a proxy government by the victors, as this would allow 
them to effectively strip by force the protections granted in IACs to the remaining combatants of 
the defeated state, depriving them of combatant immunity and POW status. Similarly, that a 
rebel group is recognized as the new legitimate government of the country cannot of itself 
transform the character of the conflict, as this would again allow the intervening states to 
unilaterally do what they will by installing their own proxies as the new state government.  
In my view, both considerations of policy and recent practice support a rule consisting of 
the following three elements: a conflict would transform from an IAC into a NIAC only when (1) 
the old regime has lost control over most of the country, and the likelihood of it regaining such 
control in the short to medium term is small or none (negative element); (2) the new regime has 
established control over most of the country, and is legitimized in an inclusive process that 
makes it broadly representative of the people (positive element); and (3) the new regime achieves 
broad, although not necessarily universal, international recognition (external element). None of 
these elements is enough by itself, but jointly they take into account both questions of legitimacy 
and factual developments on the ground while providing safeguards against abuse by an 
intervening power. With regard to both the positive and the negative elements, the degree of 
                                                          
65 Ibid, pp. 281-282. 
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control would be looked at holistically, taking into account not just troops on the ground but also 
direction over state institutions more generally, its economic assets, the media, or the nature of 
the internal legitimizing process (e.g. reasonably free and fair elections, or some other 
representative process, such as the convening of the Loya Jirga (grand tribal assembly) in 
Afghanistan). The external element would depend not just on bilateral state action but also on the 
decisions and conduct of the relevant international and regional organizations.  
The exact mix of the three elements will inevitably vary from case to case. Internal and 
external legitimization will be especially important when the new government is able to wield 
control in the country only because it is being propped up by its foreign sponsors. The purpose of 
the formula is to find a solution which will on the one hand prevent foreign interveners from 
using puppet governments, established by force alone, to claim that the IACs/belligerent 
occupations have transformed into NIACs or mostly unregulated pacific (or non-belligerent) 
occupations, yet will, on the other hand, in some cases allow a transition to occur, but do so in 
line with the rights of all peoples to self-determination, and on the basis of safeguards which will 
hinder a transition on the basis of pure force (especially when that use of force is ad bellum 
unlawful, as was the case in Iraq). 
Obviously, it may be difficult to pinpoint the exact moment of internalization in any 
given case, and thankfully in most cases it may be unnecessary to do so, but it is necessary for us 
to be aware of the relevant elements and their interplay. And doing so, we must also be aware 
that the internalization of a conflict has as its consequence a possible reduction of various 
protections under IHL. While the legal regimes applicable to IACs and NIACs have largely been 
brought together through the development of custom, significant differences and uncertainties 
still remain in areas such as grounds for detention, treatment and procedural safeguards in 
detention, combatant immunity, and status-based targeting. Thus, though transformative 
processes do not end the application of IHL altogether, their practical consequences should not 
be underestimated. These practical consequences are probably the most significant with regard to 
detention which begins before, but continues after, the moment of transformation from one type 
of conflict to another. The key issue here is the existence or modification of any authority to 
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detain; while such authority may exist directly under IHL in IACs, it likely requires the 
intervention of domestic law66 in NIACs.67  
 
End of the conflict with Al-Qaeda? 
 
This brings us to one of the most vexing questions of contemporary international relations and 
IHL, that of the existence of an armed conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda, and its 
seemingly impending end. In order to analyse this question we must first understand some 
relatively recent shifts in the underlying legal and political dynamics.  
As originally designed, and through most of its history, IHL was seen by states as a 
system of limitations on their sovereignty and freedom of action, particularly so when it comes to 
the law of non-international armed conflict.68 In other words, the baseline for international 
regulation from the classical period onwards was essentially the Lotus presumption: states were 
at liberty to do anything that international law did not expressly prohibit, including the 
unrestrained freedom to wage war, both against each other and internally. The law of war 
evolved precisely to impose such restraints, first and foremost in the inter-state context. States 
resisted the international regulation of internal conflict because of the fear – founded or not – that 
it would impose limits on how they could deal with rebels, and confer on these rebels some 
rights in international law. It is this sovereignty-induced concern of states that explains the 
IAC/NIAC dichotomy in the modern law and the higher thresholds of applicability for NIAC 
rules, in terms of intensity and organization of the non-state parties. Hence, it was rarely if ever 
in the interest of a state embroiled in a non-international armed conflict to recognize the 
                                                          
66 In the case of cross-border NIACs the domestic law authority need not necessarily come from the law of the state 
in which the hostilities take place, but could also come from the law of the state exercising powers of detention.  
67 See esp. in that regard Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB), paras. 239 ff (the 
High Court of England and Wales finding that IHL in NIAC does not provide for a power to detain, and that any 
such authority can come from domestic law or other parts of international law, such as Security Council resolutions). 
See more K. Macak, ‘No Legal Basis under IHL for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts? A Comment 
on Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence,’ EJIL: Talk!, 5 May 2014, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/no-legal-basis-
under-ihl-for-detention-in-non-international-armed-conflicts-a-comment-on-serdar-mohammed-v-ministry-of-
defence/; L. Hill-Cawthorne and D. Akande, ‘Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts?, EJIL: Talk!, 7 May 2014, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-
in-non-international-armed-conflicts/. 
68 M. Milanovic and V. Hadzi-Vidanovic, above note 1, pp. 305-308. 
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existence of such conflict – it simply did not want IHL to apply.69 This may explain why, for 
instance, the United Kingdom consistently denied the existence of a NIAC in Northern Ireland, 
claiming that the euphemistically termed ‘Troubles’ were an internal of criminal law 
enforcement despite the fact that the CA3 threshold was arguably reached,70 and why it made a 
declaration regarding Article 1(4) AP I which explicitly excluded acts of terrorism, whether 
concerted or in isolation, from the scope of armed conflict.71    
Now, however, human rights have gradually replaced, or are in the process of replacing, 
the idea of unrestrained freedom of action as the baseline for regulation, as much as culturally as 
formally.72 Instead of IHL being the only set of limitations on states, a more rigid, demanding 
and legalistic set of limitations has emerged, particularly in the internal context. States, or at least 
some states, have accordingly stopped seeing IHL as a constraining body of rules whose 
application they want to avoid in their engagements with non-state actors.73 Rather, they have 
increasingly started seeing IHL as an authorizing body of rules liberating them or derogating 
from human rights or other constraints, often on the dubious basis of the lex specialis principle.74 
For example, while IHL targeting or detention rules evolved as limitations (e.g. while people will 
inevitably be killed in wartime, deliberately target civilians is prohibited), they are now seen as 
permissive rules authorizing departures from human rights (e.g. an enemy fighter may be killed 
                                                          
69 See M. Sassòli, ‘Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law’, HPCR Occasional Paper 
Series, Winter 2006, No. 6, pp. 7-8. 
70 S. Haines, ‘Northern Ireland 1968-1998,’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification 
of Conflicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 117, 130-131, 133-136 (reporting that, according to 
unattributable information given to the author, that various legal advisers within the UK government thought that the 
NIAC threshold was reached, at least during some periods). 
71 ‘It is the understanding of the United Kingdom that the term “armed conflict” of itself and in its context denotes a 
situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether 
concerted or in isolation.  The United Kingdom will not, in relation to any situation in which it is itself involved, 
consider itself bound in consequence of any declaration purporting to be made under paragraph 3 of Article 96 
unless the United Kingdom shall have expressly recognised that it has been made by a body which is genuinely an 
authority representing a people engaged in an armed conflict of the type to which Article 1, paragraph 4, applies.’ 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Declaration 2 July 2002, available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument.  
72 See also D. Kretzmer, ‘Rethinking the Application of IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts,’ Israel Law 
Review, Vol. 42, 2008, p. 8. 
73 Cf. N. Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 
123-124. 
74 See more M. Milanovic, above note 41. Cf. the Serdar Mohammed judgment cited in above note 67. 
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even if he does not pose an imminent threat; preventive detention for reasons of security is 
authorized even if human rights law generally prohibits preventive detention).75 
To see how these dynamics evolved we need only look at US policy post-9/11.76 The US 
government from the outset decided to cast the Al-Qaeda threat and the US response thereto as a 
‘war’ for both domestic and international purposes, in order to get the detention and targeting 
authority that it thought it needed and avoid having its hands tied by any applicable rules of 
domestic constitutional law as well as international human rights law. The moniker ‘global war 
on terror’ denoted a supposed single conflict under IHL between the US on one side and Al-
Qaeda and its affiliates on the other. Initially, the US characterized this conflict as an IAC, albeit 
a strange sort of IAC which transcended the Geneva CA2 definition since one of its parties was 
not a state. In the US government’s view, the CA2 definition did not create ‘field preemption’, 77 
i.e. was not all-encompassing; put in more traditional international legalese, the notion of IAC 
was wider under customary law. This was a completely ahistorical argument; the notion of IAC 
was invented in Geneva and replaced the equally inter-state notion of war, while there was no 
evidence that it was redefined either through treaty or through custom in this particular fashion.78 
The administration also considered that the conflict could not be a NIAC as it transcended the 
borders of a single state.79 In Hamdan, the US Supreme Court rejected the government’s 
arguments and found that the conflict with Al-Qaeda could not be an IAC since it was not inter-
state, and in an ambiguous holding apparently qualified it as a NIAC.80 The position of both the 
                                                          
75 See, for example, J. Bellinger and V. Padmanabhan, ‘Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four 
Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 105, 
2011, p. 201 (repeatedly referring to targeting and detention authority under IHL, and identifying gaps of such 
authority in NIACs, which they feel is needed). See also C. Kress, ‘Some Reflections on the International Legal 
Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts,’ Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 15 No. 2, 2010, p. 
260 (speaking of states ‘availing themselves of the wider powers they can derive from the application of the law of 
non-international armed conflict (compared with international human rights law) than they are concerned by the 
restraining effect of the ensuing obligations.’).  
76 In that regard, see especially K. Anderson, ‘Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate 
Whether There Is a “Legal Geography of War”,’ in Peter Berkowitz, ed., Future Challenges in National Security 
and Law, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 2011, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1824783.  
77 Supreme Court of the United States, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Government Brief on the Merits, No. 05-184, p. 26, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2005/3mer/2mer/2005-0184.mer.aa.html 
78 See also C. Kress, above note 75, p. 255; M. Sassòli, above note 69, pp. 4-5; Lubell, above note 73, p. 96. 
79 See J. Pejic, ‘The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye,’ International Review of the 
Red Cross, Vol. 93, Issue 881, March 2011, p. 195. 
80 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), p. 630. On the fundamental lack of clarity in the Court’s decision 
on classification and its several possible interpretations, see M. Milanovic, ‘Lessons for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law in the War on Terror: Comparing Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings Case,’ International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, Issue 866, June 2007, p. 373 
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Bush and Obama administrations post-Hamdan has hence been that the conflict with Al-Qaeda is 
some sort of single, global NIAC, which is territorially unlimited in scope. 
Opinions of course differ on whether the idea of such a global NIAC is legally tenable. In 
my view, even under a flexible interpretation of the IHL framework, which would allow for 
various kinds of cross-border NIACs, the idea of a global NIAC is an oxymoron. Any NIAC 
requires the existence of protracted armed violence which by definition has to take place 
somewhere, i.e. has to be localized at least to the territory of one state. That violence can spill 
over to the territory of another state (which need not necessarily be adjacent to the primary state), 
but there has to be a nexus to the protracted violence in the primary state for IHL to apply to that 
violence.81 Thus, while one can safely speak of a NIAC (or NIACs) between the United States 
and the Taliban and other armed groups in Afghanistan, and while that conflict can spill over 
into say Pakistan or any other country – and arguably still be regulated by IHL – the existing 
legal framework does not seem to allow for a construction as amorphous as a planet-wide 
NIAC,82 particularly one in which a loose terrorist network such as Al-Qaeda is treated as a 
single organizational entity and belligerent party.83 All of the difficulties in squaring the US 
conflict with Al-Qaeda with the NIAC legal regime stem precisely from the fact that this regime 
was not designed to regulate anything like it.84 
In short, Al-Qaeda as a non-state actor was and perhaps still is a party to a NIAC in 
Afghanistan. Its off-shoots and affiliates have also been involved in other NIACs, as in Iraq or 
Yemen. But the attacks by Al-Qaeda elsewhere have (thankfully) been so sporadic, and its 
control over its allied non-state actors so loose, that it would be exceedingly difficult to say that 
the intensity and organization criteria for a NIAC were satisfied for the purpose of establishing a 
single armed conflict which is global in scope.85 One simply cannot aggregate all terrorist acts 
motivated by Islamic fundamentalism coupled with professed allegiance to Al-Qaeda all across 
the world in order to satisfy the two-fold intensity and organization test. Nor does it seem 
                                                          
81 See also S. Sivakumaran, above note 3, p. 234. 
82 See Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 56: ‘from the vantage point of international law … a non-international armed conflict 
cannot possibly assume global dimensions.’ 
83 See also C. Kress, above note 75, p. 261; J. Pejic, above note 79, p. 196; N. Lubell, above note 73, pp. 114-121. 
84 For a discussion of the difficulties in applying the IHL detention regime to suspected terrorists, see, e.g. L. Blank, 
above note 39. 
85 See also N. Lubell, ‘The War (?) against Al-Qaeda,’ in E. Wilmshurst (ed.), above note 70, pp. 421, 451-452.  
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justifiable to depart from the Tadic criteria in case of Al-Qaeda but continue applying them 
rigorously to ‘normal,’ common NIACs.  
Again, opinions on this issue will differ. But even if the conflict with Al-Qaeda could 
legally be qualified as a single NIAC, albeit a very unorthodox one, that conflict may well be 
approaching its end. The degradation that the US military operations have inflicted on the ‘core’ 
Al-Qaeda organization further threatens to push it below the NIAC organizational threshold, 
even if the threshold is applied more flexibly. Nor can this be prevented by using the concept of 
‘co-belligerency’, which was imported from the law of IAC without much consideration as to 
whether the analogy can actually be drawn. 
 US policy-makers are of course well aware that the construction of a NIAC with Al-
Qaeda, which is sustained internally because it has broad bi-partisan political appeal, is legally 
compromised by the continued degradation of core Al-Qaeda and the impending US withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.86 But this does not end the US desire to keep using targeted lethal force, e.g. 
through drones, when it considers such force to be necessary, nor, even more importantly, does 
this make the government’s life any easier with respect to those individuals that it still holds in 
preventive security detention, in Guantanamo or elsewhere, despite efforts to draw such 
detention to a close.  
 Its immense political importance notwithstanding, the US ‘war on terror’ or its rebranded 
NIAC with Al-Qaeda and associated forces is so idiosyncratic and mixed up with parallel 
questions of US domestic law and policy that we should exercise extreme caution in drawing 
from it any lessons regarding the end of application of IHL.87 As explained above, the better 
view is that IHL did not even apply in the first place to many situations within this supposedly 
single conflict. A significant number of individuals were either targeted or detained outside the 
                                                          
86 See, e.g., the speech of Jeh Johnson, at the time General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, at the 
Oxford Union, on ‘The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How Will It End?,’ 30 November 2012, 
available at: http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/ (‘I do believe that on 
the present course, there will come a tipping point – a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives 
of al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a 
strategic attack against the United States, such that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress 
authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed. At that point, we must be able to say to 
ourselves that our efforts should no longer be considered an “armed conflict” against al Qaeda and its associated 
forces.’); Remarks by President Obama at the National Defense University, 23 May 2012, available at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university .  
87 For an excellent discussion of the developments in US law and policy and an argument that the end of the conflict 
would not necessarily spell the end of any authority to use lethal force, see R. Chesney, ‘Postwar,’ in Harvard 
National Security Journal, (2014, forthcoming), draft available on SSRN at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2332228.   
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framework of any discrete, localized, legally cognizable NIAC. The individuals who were 
detained in the context of an actual NIAC, e.g. in Afghanistan, and remain in captivity, would 
benefit from the protection of IHL. The end of the conflict would spell the end of any preventive 
detention authority (and such authority probably does not even exist in NIACs for either party),88 
while the protective rules of IHL regarding treatment and procedural safeguards would continue 
applying so long as the person remains detained.  
Finally, it is important to note that the end of IHL’s application does not necessarily leave 
a regulatory void. This is not the place for any extensive argument about how human rights law 
would apply to all these situations, especially those unregulated by IHL, but for our present 
purposes I would simply caution against a dogmatic juxtaposition between ‘war’ and ‘law 
enforcement.’ Not every targeted use of lethal force, nor for that matter every preventive 
detention, would necessarily be unlawful under the relevant human rights treaties even in the 
absence of an armed conflict.89  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen how the approach to the end of IHL’s application needs to be objective and 
factual, as with its beginning – but that is easier said than done. The basic principle is that the 
end of armed conflict also ends the applicability of those parts of IHL that regulate the conduct 
of hostilities, while substantial parts of IHL actually survive the armed conflict. And while the 
end of a conflict should not be presumed lightly, with hostilities having to end with a degree of 
permanence and stability, any analysis of the ostensibly factual question of whether an IAC, 
NIAC, or occupation have ended will at least partially be driven by external policy factors and 
the consequences of any finding regarding termination. Those factors are also significantly 
influenced by how IHL interacts with other branches of international law, such as international 
                                                          
88 In other words, a rebel group fighting a state does not have the right in international law to detain the state’s 
soldiers, nor for that matter does it have the right, or power, or authority to kill them. It is simply not unlawful under 
IHL for the rebel group to kill combatants if it abides by the targeting rules of IHL, or to detain them, but it must do 
so in conformity with IHL rules on treatment in detention. The same applies for the state itself, whose authority to 
kill or detain stems from its own domestic law. See also P. Rowe, ‘Is There A Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign 
Armed Forces during a Non-International Armed Conflict?’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 
61, Issue 03, July 2012, p. 697. 
89 For a discussion of the need to apply human rights flexibly in an extraterritorial setting and strike a balance 
between universality and effectiveness, see M. Milanovic, above note 51. 
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criminal law and human rights law. Accordingly, while the basic rules may be simple to state, 
they can be very complex to apply in practice, and that, at least, is inevitable.   
 
